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BALANCING IN UNIPOLARITY: WHO IS AFRAID OF BALANCE OF 
POWER1? 
Augusto César Dall’Agnol2 
Abstract: through a critical bias, this article aims to analyze the implications of unipolarity for 
balancing behavior. In order to do so, it discusses the dynamics of balance of power theory, 
assumed to be inoperative in the post-Cold War period by main academic debates over 
unipolarity: i) unipolar stability; ii) balance of threats; iii) soft balancing; iv) liberal 
institutionalism. We argue that these approaches, including the unipolar illusion view, tied to 
the balance of power theory, overestimate the effects of unipolarity on balancing behavior of 
other states. In this sense, we assume here that issues related to the unipolar moment are directly 
connected to discussions on hegemonic interregnum. Concluding that balance of power 
dynamics, especially those of hard balancing, are still observed in the post-Cold War era, we 
criticize two main conclusions from the literature: i) that balancing became inoperative and; ii) 
that the only available strategies to other states are soft balancing and bandwagoning. In sum, 
this conclusion has directly implication on strategies available both to the United States and to 
its main competitors.     
Keywords: Unipolarity. Balance of power. Balancing.  
BALANCEAMENTO NA UNIPOLARIDADE: QUEM TEM MEDO DA BALANÇA 
DE PODER? 
Resumo: o presente artigo busca analisar, a partir de um viés crítico, as implicações da 
unipolaridade para o comportamento de balanceamento. Desta forma, trata-se de rediscutir as 
dinâmicas da teoria da balança de poder, tidas enquanto inoperantes no período pós-Guerra Fria 
pelos principais debates acadêmicos em torno da unipolaridade: i) estabilidade unipolar; ii) 
balança de ameaças; iii) soft balancing e; iv) liberal institucionalismo. O que se argumenta é 
que, inclusive a abordagem da ilusão unipolar, vinculada à teoria da balança de poder, tais 
abordagens superestimaram os efeitos da unipolaridade para o balanceamento por parte de 
outros Estados. Neste sentido, entende-se que as discussões relacionadas ao momento unipolar 
1 This title is a reference to Walt’s (2017) article: “Who’s afraid of balance of power?”. 
2 Graduate student in International Strategic Studies at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (PPGEEI - 
UFRGS). Graduate researcher at the Study Group on State Capacity, Security and Defense (GECAP). Holds a 
scholarship from the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES). E-
mail: a.agnol@gmail.com. 
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relacionem-se, diretamente, com aquelas do interregno hegemônico. Isso porque, ao concluir 
que as dinâmicas da balança de poder, especialmente o hard balancing, ainda são observadas 
no pós-Guerra Fria, inverte-se as duas principais ponderações na literatura: i) que o 
balanceamento por parte de outros tornou-se inoperante e; ii) que as únicas estratégias 
disponíveis a estes Estados seriam a de soft balancing e a de bandwagoning. Em suma, tal 
conclusão tem implicações diretas para as estratégias disponíveis tanto para os Estados Unidos 
quanto para os seus principais rivais.   
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[...] les temps court est la plus 
capricieuse, la plus trompeuse des 




 The debates over a “post-American” (Zakaria, 2008) and “post-Western” (Stuenkel, 
2016) world, over the end of “American world order” (Acharya, 2014) and of the “liberal 
international order” (Ikenberry, 2018), as well as over the emergence of a “post-hegemonic 
global order” (Vezirgiannidou, 2013) have been mainly focused on discussing ongoing 
transformations and possible future changes to order in the system. On the other hand, the most 
relevant controversies on changes to polarity in the international system after the Cold War 
often argue that the theory of balance of power does not work now as it did before, especially 
because of unipolarity4 (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2008; Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005; Wohlforth, 1999). 
Therefore, this article seeks to contribute to this special edition through a broad theory debate 
dealing with issues pertaining to a hegemonic interregnum that halted intense international 
interstate competition. 
 In that sense we point out that Schweller and Pu (2011), for example, correctly realized 
unipolarity is the only system in which balancing is a revisionist policy rather than a policy 
aimed at maintaining the status quo5. Therefore, “any state or coalition of states seeking to 
restore a balance is, by definition, revisionist” (Schweller, Pu, 2011, p. 45). Furthermore, the 
logic underpinning their argument is that “balancing under unipolarity must be preceded by a 
delegitimation phase” (Schweller, Pu, 2011, p. 46). Thus, the end of unipolarity would have to 
go through a delegitimation of the only pole in the system as well as through a process of 
deconcetration of power.  
 It is immediately worth pointing out that this argument is not wrong. However, we 
understand here that those are two different processes – albeit strongly connected. Hence, the 
study of delegitimation might be more appropriate for questions about the “liberal order led by 
the United States” (Ikenberry, 2001), while deconcentration of power is more aimed towards 
                                                            
3 “The short term is the most capricious, the most deceptive of time periods”. 
4 Reviewing Waltz’s (1979) balance of power theory is not under the scope of this article. However, it is worth 
mentioning its two main hypotheses about state behavior. The first is that when states are confronted with 
challenges to their security, they mobilize their domestic resources and seek foreign assistance from their allies. 
Those efforts to increase security are called balancing behavior. The second hypothesis is that states emulate forms 
and practices adopted by each other (Waltz, 1979, p. 124-127). 
5 For an opposite approach under which the United States are a “revisionist hegemony”, see Jervis (2006). 
498   Augusto César Dall’Agnol 
BJIR, Marília, v. 7, n. 3, p. 494-515, set./dez. 2018. 
research designs targeted at changes to polarity in the system. Therefore, this article focuses on 
analyzing the implications of unipolarity for balancing, especially internal balancing, through 
a critical perspective6. Here, we consider internal balancing to be one of several different 
possible ways for polarity in the system to change (Dawood, 2013). In light of that, we discuss 
the dynamics of balance of power theory, which many academic debated about the “unipolar 
moment” did not believe to be appropriate for the post-Cold War period (Krauthammer, 1990). 
 Therefore, the discussion revolves around the validity of balance of power theory 
(Waltz, 1979) for the post-Cold War period. After the end of the Soviet Union, we could clearly 
notice an unprecedented concentration of power in the United States. Wohlforth (1999), for 
example, is strongly concerned with using empirical data to show how exceptional United 
States’ concentration of material capabilities is. However, this article does not aim at 
demonstrating this exceptionality, as it is largely a consensus in academia. Therefore, we 
consider unipolarity to be a given fact. Here, we understand that "polarity is a theoretical 
construct; real international systems only approximate ideal types”7 (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2006, 
p. 13). 
 Furthermore, we also highlight that academic debate over unipolarity focused on its 
stability and duration. Monteiro (2011) criticizes the excessive focus of those debates on how 
and when unipolarity will end. It is worth mentioning that here we do not seek to deal with 
issues pertaining to the stability of unipolarity; its duration, however, is our main focus. This 
debate is aimed at different degrees of stability observed in different configurations of 
distribution of material capabilities among states - unipolarity (Organski, Kugler, 1980; 
Wohlforth, 1999), bipolarity (Mearsheimer, 1990; 2001; Waltz, 1964; 1979), and multipolarity 
(Deutsch, Singer, 1964) 8. 
 According to Paul (2005, p. 52), “traditional balance of power theory [...] fails to explain 
state behavior in the post–Cold War era”. Even though the balance of power theory seeks to 
explain systemic results9 rather than behavior of states, this debate stems from the fact that 
                                                            
6 According to Waltz (1979), states balance in two ways: i) alliances, or coalitions, with other states - external 
balancing; or ii) mobilization of social resources - internal balancing. 
7 I.e. polarity may vary according to criteria established for measuring it. In that sense, we must highlight the 
argument stating that the post-Cold War international system is tripolar (United States, China, and Russia), even 
though there is great asymmetry towards the United States (Cepik, 2013).   
8 For a more in-depth analysis about stability and polarity, see Van Evera (1990). 
9 Here, we understand that testing a theory about the system, such as the balance of power theory, against state 
behavior depends on a previous act of translation into foreign policy theories (Singer, 1961; Martin, 2003). This 
distinction is of uttermost importance as it pertains to the change of one level of analysis into another within the 
ladder of abstraction (Sartori, 1970; Mair, 2008). Therefore, we highlight that in terms of research design, research 
programs applying the concept of balance of power can be divided into two different paths: i) those seeking to 
explain systemic results; and ii) those seeking to explain state behavior (Nexon, 2009). 
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“since the end of the Cold War, no major power in the international system appears to be 
engaged in internal balancing against the United States” (Lieber, Alexander, 2005, p. 119). 
Brooks and Wohlforth (2008, p. 23) also argue that “general patterns of evidence since the 
advent of unipolarity are [...] inexplicable in traditional balance-of-power terms”. Furthermore, 
after the rise of unipolarity, there has been growing academic debate about grand strategies that 
may be adopted by the United States. Different authors provide largely contrasting 
recommendations on how the United States should perpetuate unipolarity10.  
Thus, we may identify five lines of arguments regarding the stability and duration of 
unipolarity. It is worth mentioning that these categories are set to organize debates, and there 
may be overlaps and points of convergence between arguments presented here. In face of that, 
this article is structured as follows. The first section seeks to discuss arguments about stability 
in unipolarity (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2005; 2008; 2016; Wohlforth, 1999). Following that, the 
second section is aimed at analyzing propositions from balance of threat (Mastanduno, 1997; 
Walt, 2002; 2006) and soft balancing (Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005) theories. Finally, the third 
section analyzes debates over liberal institutionalism (Ikenberry, 1998; 2001) and arguments 
from those who propose an “unipolar illusion”11 (Layne, 1993; 2006a; 2006b; Waltz, 1993; 
2000). The Concluding Remarks for this article will link discussions on unipolarity to those on 
hegemonic interregnum, especially as critical analysis about unipolarity allows for different 
choices both for the United States and for their main competitors. 
 
II. Unipolar stability: prohibitive costs and ineffectiveness of balance of power  
  
According to the unipolar stability perspective, unipolarity has made systemic balancing 
“prohibitively costly” (Wohlforth, 1999, p. 8), especially after the unprecedented concentration 
of material capabilities by the United States. In light of that, the balance of power theory has 
become mostly inoperative (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2008) after 1991, particularly because of non-
observance of balancing by other states12. Therefore, for unipolarity the relationship between 
distribution of material capabilities and balancing would be curvilinear. That is to say, states 
would balance each other up to a certain point. If the concentration of material capacities of a 
                                                            
10 A summary of those recommendations is not the focus of this paper but may be found in Art (2003) and Posen 
& Ross (1996). 
11 The terms “unipolar stability” and “unipolar illusion” come from Acharya (2014). 
12 According to Wohlforth (1999, p. 18), no great power is balancing the United States, and most of them reduced 
their military expenditure more rapidly than the United States. The author thus explains that any effort to directly 
compete against the United States is futile, and no state even tries to counterbalance them. 
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state exceeds that threshold, other states increasingly start to perceive balancing as futile, hence 
they would be less inclined to adopt that strategy (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2008, p. 23; Wohlforth, 
1999, p. 23; 35). 
 Consequently, the international system would be unequivocally unipolar, as “the United 
States would enjoy a much larger margin of superiority over the next most powerful state or, 
indeed, all other great powers combined than any leading state in the last two centuries”. In 
light of that, the United States would have more freedom than any other state to disregard 
system constraints and incentives (Wohlforth, 1999, p. 7-8). Furthermore, it is worth 
highlighting that the United States are the first state in modern history to enjoy a decisive 
prevalence in all components of power13 (economic, military, technological, and geopolitical) 
(Wohlforth, 1999, p. 13; 20). Therefore, because of an extremely uneven distribution of power, 
“we should expect world politics to work much differently now than in the past” (Wohlforth, 
1999, 22). Unipolarity would then transform the nature of international politics, denying 
balancing dynamics proposed by Waltz’s theory.  
 The explanation for lack of balancing against the United States offered by unipolar 
stability is, most of all, that “the expected costs of balancing remain prohibitive” (Wohlforth, 
1999, p. 8). I.e., the exceptionality of the case of the United States stems from the fact that, once 
“no country comes close to matching the comprehensive nature of U.S. power, an attempt to 
counterbalance would be far more expensive than a similar effort in any previous international 
system” (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2008, p 23). Therefore, the United States would be “immune from 
counterhegemonic balancing because overwhelming U.S. military and economic power” 
(Layne, 2006a, p. 36) and, in light of that, “unipolarity makes balancing so costly as to render 
the dynamics of balancing inoperative”14 (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2008, p. 71). Therefore, not only 
would unipolarity be peaceful, but also durable (Wohlforth, 1999, p. 8). 
 The normative component of this approach, in turn, is related to the fact that “there is 
no reason to expect that reducing either U.S. power or the level of its global engagement would 
                                                            
13 However, the understating that “unipolarity is a structure in which one state's capabilities are too great to be 
counterbalanced” (Wohlforth, 1999, p. 9) seems tautological. That is to say, from that understanding, international 
system would be unipolar if capabilities of one state are too great to be counterbalanced. At the same time, the 
main argument of the theory - that balance of power dynamics are inoperative - stems exactly from the unipolar 
organization of the system. Not only is this a cyclical process, those criteria to define polarity are extremely vague 
and unprecise. After all, impossibility of counterbalancing in unipolar systems is a premise - or a desire - rather 
than a theory construct within unipolar stability. 
14 Inoperancy of balancing dynamics are related mainly to the idea that unipolarity favors the absence of war 
between great powers and low levels of competition for prestige and security due to two reasons. The first one is 
that “the leading state's power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics”. The 
second one, in turn, is that it “reduces the salience and stakes of balance-of-power politics among the major states”. 
In light of that, systemic competition in unipolarity would be minimal (Wohlforth, 1999, p. 23; 25). 
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reduce other states’ incentives to build up their capabilities” (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2008, p. 96). 
On the contrary, Brooks and Wohlforth (2008) argue that United States’ withdrawal from the 
world as proposed by neoisolationists could easily generate new security dynamics that produce 
much greater incentives for other powers to increase their capabilities15.  
 In light of that, the clearer the distribution of power, the more states are expected to 
share expectations on the high cost of balancing, which would then probably be doomed to fail 
(Wohlforth, 1999, p. 39). Therefore, the only remaining strategy for other states would be 
bandwagoning with the United States16 (Wohlforth, 1999, p. 25). However, we must take into 
account that the objective of primacy proposed by unipolar stability “is not merely to preserve 
peace among the great powers, but to preserve US. supremacy by politically, economically, and 
militarily outdistancing any global challenger” (Posen, Ross, 1997, p. 32). To achieve that, 
proponents of unipolar stability argue that military modernization should be one of the main 
priorities to deter other states from engaging in counterbalancing strategies. Therefore, it would 
be “logical for the United States military to pursue a level of qualitative superiority over 
potential challengers that would discourage them from entering the competition” (Posen, Ross, 
1997, p. 41). 
 Finally, it is worth mentioning three unipolar stability arguments accepted here as they 
do not clearly oppose what we propose. The first is that “alliances [i.e., external balancing] 
cannot change the system's structure” and that “only the uneven growth of power [...] will bring 
the unipolar era to an end”17 (Wohlforth, 1999, p. 32). Related to that first point, the second one 
concerns the fact that “emulating the hegemon is hard [...] and extracting and allocating the 
resources needed to close the gap is harder still”18 (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2008, p. 37). Finally, 
the third argument concerns the fact that “most of the counterbalancing that has occurred since 
                                                            
15 We understand here that the unipolar stability perspective, one of the most influential on debates about current 
international system, echoes “Fukuyama’s popular view of the ‘end of history’ and the universalization of Western 
liberal democracy” (Monteiro, 2011, p. 10). 
16 This author strongly disagrees with Wohlforth’s (1999) argument that bandwagoning is the only strategy 
available for other states in a unipolar system. This is mainly due to the normative component that is intrinsic to 
the unipolar stability approach. This approach tries to convince United States politicians to reinforce unipolarity 
in order to avoid counterbalancing from other states. At the same time, the normative character for academics and 
politicians from other states is implicit: it is futile to engage in counterbalancing strategies. Considering that, we 
understand that there is no logical reason to believe bandwagoning is the only strategy available for other states in 
a unipolar system. 
17 However, simply an uneven growth rate between states is not enough for internal balancing to exist – although 
we do agree that different growth levels in states are one of the main ways for new power poles to rise. Thus, states 
need to transform that growth into military capabilities (Dawood, 2013; Waltz, 1979).  
18 This point is particularly relevant. One the other hand, we understand that those difficulties and limitations 
pertain mainly to balancing studies, as they deal with internal components of states rather than with balance of 
power itself. One example of such work can be found in Taliaferro (2009). 
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1991 has been rhetorical” (Wohlforth, 1999, p. 35), which will be discussed below when we 
criticizer the arguments of soft balancing. 
 
III. Balance of threats and soft balancing: benign hegemony and self-restraint 
 
Unlike unipolar stability, balance of threats theory seeks to explain the lack of balancing 
after the Cold War based on the idea that unipolarity is not necessarily a threat to other states19. 
Therefore, the “anomaly of states failing to balance U.S. Power largely vanishes if we focus not 
on power but on threats” (Walt, 2002, p. 133). This implies assuming that the balance of threats 
theory can explain and predict post-Cold War international system. In that sense, although the 
United States are the most powerful state in the system by a large margin, this does not mean it 
threatens vital interests of other states (Walt, 2002, p. 139). In short, balance of threat logic is 
that a state understood to be aggressive may encourage other states to counterbalance it, even 
if not the most powerful in the system. On the other hand, even the most powerful state may 
avoid being counterbalanced if it is not perceived as aggressive by other states20 (Pape, 2005, 
p. 19). 
The main understanding is that through its own self-restraint a benign hegemon may be 
able to prevent other great powers from rising and engaging in balancing strategies21 
(Mastanduno, 1997, p. 88; Walt, 2002, p. 140; 146). In light of that, we must also point out that 
if the United States have an interest in “discouraging other states [...] from joining forces against 
it [external balancing]”, then they should “eschew policies that force different adversaries to 
overlook their differences and to make common cause against the United States” (Walt, 2005, 
p. 227). However, such self-restraint does not directly imply a reduction of United States’ 
material power. Therefore, as unipolar stability, balance of threats understands that the 
enormous difference in power between the United States and other states helps them to maintain 
the system unbalanced. In that sense, “maintaining its material superiority is the first step 
                                                            
19 This approach is based on Walt’s (1987) work. The main criticisms adopted against balance of threat proposals 
may be found in Layne (1993, p. 13-15; 2006a, p. 20-22). We especially understand that “the theory’s most 
important weakness is its inability to draw a clear distinction between ‘power’ and ‘threat’” (Layne, 2006a, p. 20).  
20 Such understanding of lack of counterbalancing from other states because of the benign character of the United 
States and because of the fact that other states do not see them as a threat may be also found in Glaser (2011).  
21 This understanding comes specially from the fact that in unipolarity - differently from bipolar and multipolar 
systems - the only power pole is not so sensitive to systemic constraints. Consequently, balance of threats’ 
argument is that, faced with this situation, the United States should restrain themselves, so they do not encourage 
new counterbalancing dynamics. The same criticism Schweller (2001) voices against Ikenberry (2001) regarding 
the possibility of self-restraint in a unipolar system may be applied to Walt (2002; 2006). 
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towards discouraging the formation of a countervailing coalition” against the United States22 
(Walt, 2002, p. 142). 
Likewise, if the United States wish to maintain their prevalent position for as long as 
possible, they should “persuade the rest of the world that U.S. primacy is preferable to the likely 
alternatives” (Walt, 2005, p. 247). Thus, what we may conclude is that, albeit indirectly, 
unipolarity does not represent a change in the nature of international politics, as advocated by 
unipolar stability. This is due to the fact that the system would only refrain from taking off-
balancing actions if states did not see United States’ intentions as threatening23. Otherwise, 
counterbalancing measures would be resumed. The largest issue at hand, then, is how can the 
United States maintain their material primacy but, at the same time, not be seen as a threat by 
other states24. Walt’s (2002; 2006) ongoing answer to that question is self-restraint through an 
offshore balancing25 strategy. 
 A third interpretation for unipolarity is soft balancing (Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005). We 
immediately have to point out that this approach is closely related to the arguments of balance 
of threats (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2008, p. 61), even though that is not widely recognized. On the 
other hand, although those two lines of arguments are close in some major points, they 
constitute different perspectives on unipolarity.  
 In light of that, “if balancing implies restraining the power and threatening behavior of 
the hegemonic actor, strategies other than military buildups [internal balancing] and alliance 
formation [external balancing] should be included in balance of power theory”26 (Paul, 2005, 
p. 71). Therefore, soft balancing includes “actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military 
preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive 
unilateral U.S. military policies” (Pape, 2005, p. 10). In short, in a unipolar system, other states 
should adapt to unipolarity through balancing strategies that avoid direct military confrontation 
with the United States.  
                                                            
22 Criticism voiced against unipolar stability because of the fact that supremacy makes all counterbalancing 
dynamics inoperable is similar to the one expressed here against balance of threat. I.e., the existence, or lack 
thereof, of counterbalancing from other states is conditioned to their perception about United States’ actions and 
intents, and not only to excessive concentration of power in one pole of the international system. Therefore, theory 
arguments blend with recommendations and, mostly, with wishes from those who propose them. 
23 According to Layne (1993), because of the idea of benign hegemon, balance of threats is similar to hegemonic 
stability (Gilpin, 1981), mainly under a collective goods perspective - Jervis (2009) also recognizes that. We further 
understand that the argument about a possibility of self-restraint by the benign hegemon also links balance of 
threats to liberal institutionalists (Ikenberry, 1998; 2001). This point will be developed here later.  
24 Walt (2002, p. 153) recognizes this, albeit indirectly. 
25 About the offshore balancing strategy, see Mearsheimer and Walt (2016). 
26 We understand here that soft balancing mistakenly equates balancing with restraint or constraint. This point will 
be developed later.  
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 Therefore, the international system had no balancing whatsoever during the 1990s, as 
the cases of Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999) show. This situation would only 
change “once the United States began to act in ways that would undermine its reputation for 
benign intent” (Pape, 2005, p. 21). Consequently, the adoption of soft balancing strategies by 
other states does not “lie in a shift in U.S. relative power, which has hardly changed in this short 
time” (Pape, 2005, p. 25). Instead,  
[...] the key reason is that the Bush strategy is changing the United States’ long-
enjoyed reputation of benign intent. Precisely because the United States is already so 
powerful, even a small change in how other perceive the aggressiveness of U.S. 
intentions can cause other major powers to be concerned about their security (Pape, 
2005, p. 25). 
 
 In light of that, Pape (2005, p. 38) argues that after the Cold War soft balancing replaced 
traditional balancing “as the principal reaction of major powers to the Bush administration’s 
preventive war doctrine”. Such change in perception about Unites States’ intent entailed, firstly, 
soft balancing strategies and then, “if the unipolar leader’s aggressive policies do not abate, 
increasingly intense balancing efforts that could evolve into hard balancing”27 (Pape, 2005, p. 
18).  
 After those considerations, the remainder of this section on soft balancing shall be 
reserved for criticisms we voice against this approach. The first criticism will not be analyzed 
in-depth here but argues that soft balancing approaches do not “offer effective means for 
distinguishing soft balancing from routine diplomatic friction between countries” (Alexander, 
Lieber, 2005, p. 125). The second criticism is one of the contributions made by this article to 
the debate and is based on arguments by Brooks and Wohlforth (2005) – even though at the 
end, conclusions reached here are substantially different from those reached by those authors.  
 According to Brooks e Wohlforth (2005), constraints pointed out by soft balancing 
theorists are not a consequence of balance of power dynamics and cannot be explained by 
adding soft balancing to that theory. Therefore, “current practice of using balance of power 
concepts to describe and explain this behavior is costly in theoretical and policy terms” (Brooks, 
Wohlforth, 2005, p. 106). Thus, the “tendency to shoehorn policy disputes and bargaining 
dynamics into a simplistic balancing narrative has the effect of generating unwarranted support 
                                                            
27 It is important to mention here Alexander & Lieber’s (2005) perspective on the reasons for lack of balancing. 
Opposing Pape (2005), those authors argue that this is mainly due to the fact that United States grand strategy after 
9/11 was a threat for a very limited number of regimes and regions only. Consequently, “most countries either do 
not have a direct stake in the ‘war on terror’ or, often, share the U.S. interest in the reduction of threats from rogue 
states and terrorist groups” (Alexander, Lieber, 2005, p. 110). 
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for balance of power theory” (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2005, p. 106). And consequently, “such 
behavior does not validate balance of power theory” (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2005, p. 107).  
 Besides, according to them in “a unipolar world, soft balancing can be seen as the first 
observable implication that the world works the way balance of power theory expects it to” 
(Brooks, Wohlforth, 2005, p. 107). Brooks and Wohlforth (2005) believe that any effort to 
invoke an idea of soft balancing is not fruitful and strengthens balance of power theory. In short, 
the argument may be summarized in the idea that soft balancing is a way to “rework balance of 
power theory to accommodate a world without hard balancing” (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2005, p. 
107). This is directly related to the recommendation from Brooks and Wohlforth (2005, p. 107) 
that academics “would be wise to invest their talents in investigating the novel dynamics of 
great power bargaining in today’s unipolar system rather than seeking to stretch old analytical 
concepts”. 
 In that sense, we understand that even though their criticism is adequate, their 
conclusions differ from those proposed by this article. Therefore, our understanding is that Pape 
(2005) and Paul (2005) seek to explain this anomaly in balance of power theory by creating ad 
hoc concepts. After all, those concepts distort – through conceptual stretching – the original 
concept of balancing proposed by Waltz (1979) in order to overcome criticism made to the 
predictive power oh balance of power theory. We argue, thus, that balance of power theory does 
not require any ad hoc changes to overcome those criticisms28.  
 Just as Brooks and Wohlforth (2005), then, we understand that soft balancing 
propositions are a failed attempt to stretch balance of power theory to the post-Cold War era. 
Unlike them, however, we assume that this failure does not come from the fact that the theory 
cannot be applied to that time period, but precisely from its predictive strength, which makes 
any soft balancing contribution unnecessary to maintain it. We argue here, hence, that Brooks 
and Wohlforth’s (2005) criticism, albeit partially correct, reflects a relentless effort to sustain 
the argument that balance of power dynamics have become inoperative after the Cold War.  
 
IV. Liberal institutionalism and unipolar illusion: liberal order or balance of power? 
 
The fourth approach – liberal institutionalism – is marginally related to balance of 
threats as it understands that the United States may be a benign hegemon or that they may self-
                                                            
28 Including those proposed by Layne (2006a), one of the strongest supporters of balance of power, through the 
idea of leash-slipping, as we will discuss below. 
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restrain voluntarily, especially through binding institutions29. Ikenberry (2001, p. 54) argues, 
for example, that when creating “an institutionalized order”, a hegemonic state “might lock in 
favorable arrangements that continue beyond the zenith of its power”. Therefore, international 
order may remain intact even after the main pole of power loses its preeminent position in the 
system30. 
In light of that, institutions and alliances such as NATO work in predictable ways to 
bind not only smaller states, but also the United States31 (Ikenberry, 2001, p. 246-256). I.e., 
instead of perceiving the possibility of a long unipolar era from United States’ material primacy, 
Ikenberry (1998; 2001) argues that stability and duration of unipolarity are products of 
institutional arrangements built by the United States since the end of World War II. Therefore, 
unipolarity does not necessarily lead to counterbalancing by other states32. 
 In that sense, the United States restrained themselves through a network of binding 
alliances and multilateral commitments. Therefore, “American hegemony is reluctant, open, 
and highly institutionalized - or in a word, liberal. This is what makes it acceptable to other 
countries that might otherwise be expected to balance against hegemonic power, and it is also 
what makes it so stable and expansive” (Ikenberry, 1998, p. 77). In light of that, from a 
consensual and non-coercive constitutional order, the “hegemonic state gives up some freedom 
on the use of its power in exchange for a durable and predictable order that safeguards its 
interests in the future”33 (Ikenberry, 1998, p. 56). 
Finally, the fifth and last approach, unipolar illusion, indicates that the “unipolar 
moment” was just an interlude that would soon give way to multipolarity34 (Layne, 1993; Waltz, 
1993). This stems from the fact that concentration of power on a single state overcomes all 
dimensions that may be included in other states’ threat calculations. Therefore, United States’ 
unipolarity is threatening regardless of their location, intention and offense-defense balancing 
                                                            
29 According to Layne (2006a, p. 26), for example, many primacists believe the United States may be a benign 
hegemon because they are a liberal democracy. Consequently, we must reflect that even with their different 
approaches (material x immaterial), unipolar stability and liberal institutionalist approaches are not necessarily 
antagonistic. This point can be seen in Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth (2013). 
30 Even though this is relevant literature to understand the relationship between unipolarity and balancing, we will 
focus on liberal institutional arguments, especially because they are closer to the debate on systemic order than to 
the debate on system polarity. 
31 About the argument in favor of liberal international order, see Deudney and Ikenberry (1999).  
32 It is worth highlighting Kupchan’s (1998) contribution in that regard. According to him, the idea of self-restraint 
is fundamental also in unipolarity. He proposes the concept of “benign unipolarity”, especially for regional orders. 
Therefore, Kupchan (1998) assumes unipolarity in the international system may give way to a “benign tripolarity”.  
33 Criticism against Ikenberry’s (2001) work may be found in Schweller (2001). We wholly agree with the criticism 
voiced by the latter against the former.  
34 Layne (1993, p. 7) argued, for example, that unipolarity would give way to multipolarity anytime between 2000 
and 2010. However, Layne (2006b, p. 147) himself admitted his prediction was wrong. This point will be further 
discussed below. 
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(Elman, 2003). In short, balancing foreseen by the balance of power theory would occur rapidly, 
thus neither a primacy strategy nor “benign/benevolent hegemony” could prevent 
counterbalancing (Layne, 2006a, p. 26). 
 Therefore, “faced with unbalanced power, some states try to increase their own strength 
or they ally with others to bring the international distribution of power into balance” (Waltz, 
2000, p. 28). That means “states balance against hegemons, even those like the United States 
that seek to maintain their preeminence by employing strategies based more on benevolence 
than coercion” (Layne, 1993, p. 7). And that is because “a dominant power may behave with 
moderation, restraint, and forbearance. Even if it does, however, weaker states will worry about 
its future behavior” (Waltz, 1997, p. 915). After all, unipolarity threatens other states and makes 
them seek to restore balance of power (Waltz, 1997, p. 15-16). 
According to Waltz (2000), thus, the structure of the international system continues to 
be anarchical. The difference, however, is that “for a time we will live with unipolarity” (Waltz 
2000, p. 39). What changed, then, is the fact that since the demise of the Soviet Union, old 
limitations and constraints are more openly applied to the United States (Waltz, 1993, p. 52; 
79). Furthermore, according to the unipolar illusion perspective, the United States’ position as 
the only power pole depends mainly on the rise of other states (Layne, 1993, p. 8). Hence, 
“theory enables one to say that a new balance of power will form but not to say how long it will 
take” (Waltz, 2000, p. 30). And that is because “in a unipolar system, the structural pressures 
on eligible states to increase their relative capabilities and become great powers should be 
overwhelming” (Layne, 1993, p. 12). In light of that, we can infer that “the United States is not 
exempt from the fate of past hegemons” (Layne, 2006a, p. 20) as proposed by unipolar stability.  
However, Layne (2006b, p. 147) admits he and Waltz (1993; 2000) were wrong, 
especially in predicting that balancing against the United States would quickly restore balance 
of power distribution within the international system35. Therefore, Layne (2006a, p. 9) 
introduces the concept of leash-slipping, through which states “build up their military 
capabilities to maximize their ability to conduct an independent foreign policy”36. Layne’s 
                                                            
35 Retrospectively, however, it is interesting to point out that Layne (1993, p. 37) and Waltz (2000, p. 30) 
understood, respectively, Germany and Japan; and the European Union, China and Japan as counterbalancing 
states. We will not judge here this aspect of the predictive power of their theory. We will only point out that both 
the proposition that states would quickly counterbalance the United States’ concentration of material capabilities 
and that balance of power would be restored again soon do not invalidate their theory. This will be further discussed 
in our concluding remarks.   
36 Layne (2006b, p. 143) also indicates that “we need to rethink how we define balancing [...] Thus, in today’s 
unipolar era [...] terrorism, soft balancing, opaque balancing, and semi-hard balancing” are examples of 
counterbalancing. However, those concepts suffer the same criticism as soft balancing, distancing Layne (2006a; 
2006b) from Waltz’s (1979) balance of power theory in that regard.  
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(2006b, p. 147) analysis is correct in stating that balance of power theorists “did not foresee 
that virtually all the possible counterbalancers had internal problems that constrained their 
ability to engage in effective hard balancing against the United Sates”. This is exactly the point 
Taliaferro (2009) highlights, especially from the relationship between state power and internal 
balancing. 
  
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
 We immediately have to highlight that discrepancies observed between those five 
interpretations about unipolarity “exist only because there is sufficiently ample empirical 
evidence to ground directly opposite arguments” (Magalhães, 2010, p. 40). In light of that, this 
article was not an effort to contrast theory proposals against empirical observations from the 
post-Cold War period, especially because there are evidences to support each of those views. 
To conclude – albeit in a partial way – the discussion on the relationship between unipolarity 
and balancing, it is worth mentioning three points. 
 First, the fact that all work mentioned here deals mainly with external balancing 
strategies, i.e., creation of alliances (external balancing), or soft balancing strategies. That 
happens in detriment of analyses focused on internal and hard balancing. Therefore, from 
research based on those two types of balancing, we understand that it is not necessary to amend 
balance of power theory. On the other hand, what has to be done is changing the focus to states’ 
domestic level to analyze internal balancing strategies. In that sense, for example, work by 
Dawood (2013), Resende-Santos (2007), Steff and Khoo (2014) and Taliaferro (2009) allow us 
to fully understand the post-Cold War period using balance of power theory, especially 
considering military innovation and emulation as internal balancing strategies37. Consequently, 
if external balancing is not observed, the path is to analyze internal balancing, and not to 
multiply new concepts that express, at the end, routine diplomatic friction between countries.    
 Second, besides changing the focus of analysis, we understand theorists who analyzed 
the unipolar period to have fallen into a short-term trap as presented by Braudel (1958, p. 744). 
That happens because “the unipolar period is too short to test structural mechanisms” 
(Monteiro, 2011, p. 12). Therefore, an interpretation that balance of power is inoperative since 
                                                            
37 One of the main criticisms voiced against Waltzian neorealism is the lack of a theory about the state (Wendt, 
1987, p. 342). However, we understand that Waltz (1979) does propose a theory about the state, albeit minimalist 
or rudimentary (Hobson, 2000, p. 19; p. 30). The main contributions towards the development of a neorealist 
theory about the state may be found in Resende-Santos (2007), through the proposal of a second image reversed 
theory (Gourevitch, 1978). 
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the end of the Cold War because no new balance of power has been observed does not mean 
states are not counterbalancing the United States38 (Layne, 2006a; Lobell, 2018). That is to say 
that even if the system remains unipolar – according to the criteria adopted by Brooks and 
Wohlforth (2016) – it is at least hard to deny there are ongoing balance of power dynamics, 
given: i) the denouncement of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2001 and the search 
for nuclear primacy by the United States, as well as the development of the concept of 
Conventional Prompt Global Strike (Lieber, Press, 2006; Woolf, 2018); and ii) consequent 
development of hypersonic weapons by Russia and China as a direct response to the 
denouncement of the ABM Treaty39 (Dall’Agnol, Secchi, 2018).  
 The third point is that the unipolar stability perspective, one of the most influential on 
debates about the current international system, echoes “Fukuyama’s popular view of the ‘end 
of history’ and the universalization of Western liberal democracy” (Monteiro, 2011, p. 10). Just 
as the credibility of the “end of history” is compromised, we understand it is a matter of time 
until unipolar stability’s credibility also is. That is due to the fact that the impossibility of 
counterbalancing in unipolar systems is a premise – or a desire – rather than a theory construct. 
Therefore, unipolar stability may be seen under Cox’s (1981, p. 128) criticism that “theory is 
always for someone and for some purpose”. In this case, a theory implicitly and explicitly 
destined to maintain unipolarity. 
 Finally, we argue that the hegemonic interregnum is a moment that witnesses both 
reconfiguration in the order and in the polarity of the system. Therefore, this article sought to 
analyze factors pertaining to the application of balance of power theory to unipolarity – even 
though it is worth mentioning the fact that “for the first time since the 1930s, the United States 
has elected a president who is actively hostile to liberal internationalism” (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 
7). That means, thus, that forces contrary to liberal order are found both outside the United 
States (Russia and China), and inside the country (Donald Trump) (Dall’Agnol, 2017). 
However, we must avoid the confusion of not separating changes to polarity from changes to 
order – for example, assuming delegitimization is a step preceding traditional balancing 
(Schweller, Pu, 2011). That is to say, states delegitimize the liberal order rather than United 
States’ unipolarity. Therefore, states counterbalance the distribution of capabilities, which is 
extremely concentrated in the United States, rather than the liberal order. We understand, hence, 
                                                            
38 Lobell (2018) briefly argues for a “granular theory of balancing” to analyze the post-Cold War period. However, 
that author’s empirical bases concern British balancing against Germany and Italy between 1936 and 1939. 
39 An analysis of the development of hypersonic weapons by the United States, Russia, and China can be found in 
Speier et al (2017). It is also worth mentioning Russian responses to United States’ Third Offset Strategy (Kashin, 
Raska, 2017). 
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that those are two different paths, both extremely relevant to study the hegemonic interregnum 
period. 
 Likewise, the dynamics of balance of power also affect the destiny of unipolarity. Thus, 
cursory use of unipolarity theories may result in significant consequences for system polarity. 
That is due, for example, to the fact that they indicate the only available strategies for other 
states in a unipolar system are soft balancing and bandwagoning, i.e., strategies to accommodate 
to United States hegemony or with limited revisionist possibilities – if we accept a soft 
balancing idea. What we can conclude from that alleged limitation of options available for other 
states is that it seeks to: i) maintain and preserve unipolar stability, guaranteeing they are not 
engaged in hard balancing strategies; and ii) allow the United States to enjoy the benefits of 
their position within the system. Since internal balancing is a process that includes both a 
political and economic phase and a military phase (Dawood, 2013), we would expect this 
process to take some time to bring about effective change in the distribution of material 
capabilities in the system. However, to assume that the dynamics of balance of power do not 
operate in unipolarity, especially based on an idea of prohibitive costs, is to indirectly work in 
favor of maintaining the hegemonic interregnum by trying to convince possible competitors of 
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